...To defeated Germany in World War I, the Entente countries under the Versailles Treaty permitted the maintenance of a small naval fleet exclusively for the defense of its territorial waters: 6 old battleships of no more than 10,000 tons displacement, the same number of light cruisers of 6,000 tons each, and two dozen old destroyers.
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| Diagram of the passage of Vice-Admiral Ciliax's Brest squadron from Brest through the English Channel to the ports of the 'Third Reich'. |
The displacement of combat ships built to replace obsolete ones was not to exceed these limits. But even during the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), German militarists began construction of three "pocket battleships" of the Deutschland class (displacement 11,700 tons, speed 28 knots, main armament — six 280-mm guns). The power plant, unusual for that time — 8 diesel engines with a total output of 54,000 hp — provided them with an enormous cruising range of 20,000 miles. In short, these were not "coastal defenders" but ocean raiders designed to operate independently on international shipping lanes. Nevertheless, in 1935, England signed an agreement with Nazi Germany, lifting the Versailles restrictions concerning the fleet. Within a year, the high-speed (32-knot) raider battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (31,800 tons, nine 280-mm guns) were launched, followed by the gigantic battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz (52,800 tons, 29 knots, eight 380-mm guns). The latter were to be accompanied on raiding operations by the heavy cruisers Prinz Eugen, Admiral Hipper, Lützow, and Seydlitz (14,000 tons, 32.5 knots, eight 203-mm guns).
With the outbreak of World War II, Nazi raiders inflicted considerable damage on England and France. For example, in April 1940, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two destroyers (1,471 sailors and 41 airmen perished). In early 1941, both battleships completed another raid on Allied Atlantic shipping, destroying 22 transports. Fearing that British ships were waiting for them in the North Sea, the battleships took refuge in the Nazi-occupied French port of Brest, which had full facilities for repairing their machinery. In the summer, the Prinz Eugen joined them there, having escorted Bismarck in the Atlantic on that ship's first and last sortie.
By the beginning of 1942, the squadron's stay in Brest had become, from the Kriegsmarine command's point of view, not only pointless — the ships were not taking part in combat operations — but also dangerous, since the port was regularly bombed by aircraft. Therefore, British intelligence correctly assumed that the squadron would try to leave Brest. But where to?
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It could attempt to break through the Strait of Gibraltar to join the fascist Italian fleet. However, while the ships crossed the Bay of Biscay and rounded the coast of Spain, they would inevitably be spotted by British patrols, and the ships, coastal batteries, and aircraft stationed at Gibraltar would have given them a hot reception in the narrow, well-covered strait.
The squadron could try to slip through to the ports of the "Third Reich" via the Atlantic, passing around the British Isles. But then it would have to stealthily pass through the patrol lines of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Ciliax's squadron would have been pursued by battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carrier aircraft. In short, the hunt for the Bismarck would have been repeated, with a similar finale.
A dash through the English Channel? Then Ciliax need not fear meeting British battleships, which the Admiralty would never have sent into the heavily mined strait, under attack from Luftwaffe bombers and German coastal artillery. Of course, the squadron faced the same dangers from the British — caught among minefields, under coastal battery fire, and subjected to attacks from aircraft and torpedo boats, it would have been in a very unfavorable position, if not a deadly trap. But the Kriegsmarine staff counted precisely on British admirals reasoning in this manner. Moreover, Operation Cerberus was to take just over a day. Risky? Certainly, but Kaiser's and later Nazi military planners were prone to adventurism in solving strategic and tactical problems.
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After the war, many memoirs of former Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe officers appeared in the West, telling the world about "lost victories." They did not overlook Operation Cerberus, being generous in their praise of its authors and executors. As it turns out, in preparing it, the naval command developed an "avalanche" system — a gradual buildup of covering forces as the squadron advanced.
So, the squadron leaves Brest accompanied by 6 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats at night, in order to pass the most dangerous stretch during the day, under fighter cover. Off Cherbourg, 20 patrol vessels join the escort, off Cape Gris-Nez — another 24 patrol vessels, minesweepers, and combat boats. Moreover, a "protective umbrella" of 16 Messerschmitts is constantly over the squadron, with over 200 Luftwaffe aircraft ready to support them at any moment. Even such a detail as a following tide was taken into account. It would increase the ships' speed, and the higher water level in the Channel would reduce the likelihood of their striking moored mines.
British coastal batteries were to be suppressed by fire from German guns on the French coast. Along the entire route where the squadron was to change course, six ships were to be stationed — serving as floating navigational markers...
But no matter what "avalanche" covered Operation Cerberus, it was very vulnerable; its basis, as we have already said, was a simple reliance on surprise. "This undertaking could have had a chance of success only if it were possible to keep its preparation completely secret," admitted West German Admiral Ruge, who was involved in supporting the operation during the war. And here we come directly to the "behind-the-scenes" aspect of the matter, to those actions undertaken to disinform British intelligence. And in this regard, the Nazi secret services had experience...
Deceptive actions aimed at a single goal were carried out by various means. For example, a few days before the operation began, the mechanics of the squadron's ships demonstratively took on board a large supply of engine oil used for sailing in equatorial latitudes. At the same time, quartermasters ordered several hundred sets of tropical naval uniforms. The British learned of this immediately from their agents.
On February 10, the commanders of the battleships and cruiser, along with Ciliax's senior staff officers, received invitations to a banquet in Paris hosted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Grand Admiral Raeder. The invitations were sent out in such a way that Intelligence Service agents would be convinced: on February 12, at 20:00, the squadron's senior officers would be presented to the commander at his Paris residence. At the same time, counterintelligence officers ensured that word spread about a reception being given on the evening of the same February 12 by Brest's commandant in honor of the naval officers. The wives of several German naval officers informed their French servants that their husbands would be on shore leave until morning that day.
On February 11, a few hours before the ships left port, an anti-torpedo net was placed around the Scharnhorst, clearly visible from the air. It was indeed spotted by the pilot of a British reconnaissance aircraft, and the Admiralty, upon receiving his report, concluded that this battleship was not planning to put to sea in the near future.
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Early in the morning of February 12, an air raid alert was sounded in Brest, and the harbor was shrouded in a smoke screen. This had happened before, but this time it was meant to hide the now-empty berths of the Brest squadron from British aerial reconnaissance.
Thus, the secret services of the "Third Reich" diligently tried to convince the Admiralty leadership that the Brest squadron would not leave port, at least until February 14. And if it did leave, it would most likely head to the South Atlantic, to the zone of busy Allied shipping, where Hitler's submarines and auxiliary raider cruisers were already operating.
True, shortly before the operation, Kriegsmarine minesweepers began to appear in various parts of the English Channel, but they did so openly, conducting what appeared to be routine control sweeping. It was indeed sweeping, but this time the fairways for Ciliax's ships were being cleared. At the same time, Luftwaffe radio operators began seemingly unsystematically "jamming" British radars. On February 12, when dense interference appeared on their screens, the British operators initially paid it no attention. What this led to, readers already know — coastal batteries fired at the squadron blindly...
So were the British completely misled, and was the gamble on surprise successful? This is precisely the version that representatives of the Admiralty and the official historians of the Royal Navy persistently insisted upon, but...
In 1975, a book by retired intelligence officer Winterbotham, "The Ultra Secret," appeared in London. It turns out that as early as 1932, Polish cryptographers learned the secret of the German electric cipher machine Enigma, and in July 1939, when the threat of German attack had become inevitable, they passed all the information about it to the French and British. Yet the Hitlerite command used Enigma throughout the war for its most secret communications with commanders of the armed forces of the "Third Reich"! "Shortly after my colleagues from the Army and Air Force began their work (meaning the decryption of enemy radio messages — I.B.), the German naval Enigma was cracked," writes Winterbotham, adding that intercepted "naval radio messages were sent to the Admiralty in the German original, however, messages concerning the movements of German submarines and surface ships were nevertheless translated... and sent to the Coastal Command," which was monitoring the Brest squadron. So it turns out that the British knew perfectly well the timing of Operation Cerberus, and the references to surprise are just a pretense? Then why, given the Admiralty's awareness, did the carefully planned counter-operation Fuller nevertheless end in fiasco?
Igor BOECHIN, historian